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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Mississippi attempted to pass a personhood
amendment to its state constitution.' In 2008 and 2010, Colorado
attempted to pass similar amendments to its state constitution. 2 Some
in the pro-life movement view these amendments as ways to reduce
or eliminate abortion.3 The initiatives are rooted in Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade, where he stated:
The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a
"person" within the language and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they
outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of
fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is
established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses,

1. See, e.g., Jacques Berlinerblau, Why the Mississippi Personhood Amendment SelfImploded, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/georgetown-onfaith/post/why-the-mississippi-personhood-amendment-selfimploded/201 1/11/
09/gIQApQql5M blog.htmi; Maggie Gallagher, Learning Lessons of Mississippi's Personhood
Amendment, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles
/2011/11/18/learning lessons of mississippispersonhood amendmentl 12115.html; Michael J.
New, Mississippi Personhood Amendment Defeated at the Polls, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE
(Nov.
10,
2011),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/282787/mississippi-personhoodamendment-defeated-polls-michael-j-new.
2. Amendment 48-Definition of Person Election Results, DENVER POST (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2008/48-definition-of-person/
(hereinafter
Amendment 48 Election Results); Amendment 62-Definition of Person Election Results, DENVER
POST (Nov. 3, 2010), http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2010/62-definitionof-person/ (hereinafter Amendment 62 Election Results).
3. See, e.g., Rita M. Dunaway, The Personhood Strategy: A State's Prerogative to Take
Back Abortion Law, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 327 (2011); PERSONHOOD USA,
www.personhoodusa.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
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for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
specifically by the Amendment.
The argument, then, is that the appellant's case (the pro-choice case)
would "collapse" if the unborn were deemed persons because their
right to life would be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The Fourteenth Amendment protection of a right to life would
trump the privacy right that the Court found in Roe v. Wade and
create a case for overruling Roe v. Wade and the surrounding abortion
jurisprudence. Some in the pro-life movement argue that by
amending the state constitutions to include the unborn in the
definition of "person," a factual issue could be created for
reexamining Roe. The unborn would therefore be granted the rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and would be protected from those
who seek to infringe on those rights.6 However, this strategy of
amending state constitutions to eliminate a right to abortion has come
under scrutiny from both pro-choice and pro-life thinkers.'
Part II of this article will summarize Roe v. Wade, the
"Blackmun Hole," and the potential effects of a personhood
amendment. Part III will review some example personhood
amendments and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. Part IV will
offer a model personhood amendment which addresses the
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
6.

See PERSONHOOD USA, What is Personhood?, http://www.personhoodusa.com/what-is-

personhood (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (describing the "Blackmun Hole" and the ability of an
amendment to fill that hole).
7. See, e.g., Molly E. Carter, Regulating Abortion Through Direct Democracy: The Liberty
ofAll Versus the Moral Code of a Majority, 91 B.U. L. REV. 305 (2011); Paul Benjamin Linton, A
Fool's Errand: State "Personhood"Proposals, HUMAN LIFE REV., Fall 2009, at 61 (hereinafter
Fool's Errand); Lawrence J. Nelson, Of Persons and PrenatalHumans: Why the Constitution is
Not Silent on Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155 (2009); Alex Walen, The
Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 161
(2005); David Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential Reach of a Human Life Amendment, 8
AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1982).
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weaknesses of the other examples. Part V will discuss some
considerations the pro-life movement should keep in mind regarding
the personhood amendment approach. Finally, I will conclude by
arguing that the pro-life movement should use the proposed
amendment and should actively pursue passage in each state.

H1.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ABORTION RIGHT AND THE
"BLACKMUN HOLE"
A. THE PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS IN ROE V. WADE

Justice Blackmun authored the seven-judge majority opinion
in Roe v. Wade, the January 22, 1973 case which significantly limited
a state's ability to regulate abortion.! The case examined and declared
unconstitutional a Texas statute9 that imposed criminal sanctions on
any person who helped a pregnant woman to procure an abortion. 0
Justice Blackmun began by examining whether or not a right
to privacy exists in the Constitution." Justice Blackmun found such a
right in the Fourteenth Amendment but acknowledged the district
court's opinion that the right arose from the Ninth Amendment. 2
Having established a right to privacy, the Court turned its focus to
whether that right was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."" The Court
discussed the harms that could occur if the state denied a woman the
ability to procure an abortion and concluded that there would be
significant harms from this denial. 4 Additionally, Justice Blackmun
looked to history for a pregnant woman's right to choose an
abortion." Justice Blackmun's history examined ancient attitudes,'"
8.
9.
10.
11.

Roe, 410 U.S. at ll3.
Id.at 117 n.1.
Id at 164.
Id. at 129.

12.

Id. at 153 (in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), the Supreme Court

found a right to privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
13. Id.
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (The Court discussed harms including medical problems from the
pregnancy, a "distressful" life and future, psychological harm, mental and physical harms from

childcare, distress from an unwanted child, familial issues with a new child, and the stigma
associated with unwed motherhood. For an additional discussion of the harms of abortion and
what constitutes a significant harm, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973).).
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-52.
16. Id. at 130 (finding that abortion was practiced in Greek and Roman times and that the
little protection that was afforded to the unborn was prosecutable as a violation of the father's
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the Hippocratic Oath," common law,'" English statutory law,19
American Law,20 the American Medical Association,2' the American
Public Health Association,22 and the American Bar Association.23
Based on this history,24 Justice Blackmun found that restrictions on
right to this offspring).
17. Id. at 130-32 (finding that the Hippocratic Oath included language similar to "I will give
no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not
give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion." However, Justice Blackmun found that the oath
echoed the Pythagorean school of philosophers and was not the typical Greek view of abortion.).
18. Id at 132-36 (finding a mixed approach to when a person came into being and when
punishment should attach to abortion. Possible moments of "personhood" included the quickening
and an arbitrary schedule of forty days for males and eighty days for females. Also, Justice
Blackmun found that punishment for abortion was mixed in the common law, including
punishment for homicide, manslaughter, felony, misdemeanor, and no punishment at all.).
19. Id at 136-38 (finding that the first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act of
1803, punished abortion of a quick fetus as a capital crime and a pre-quick fetus as a felony.
However, more recent laws, including the Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 1929, emphasized the
capability of being born alive. An even more recent law, the Abortion Act of 1967, permitted
abortion if the pregnancy would risk the life of the pregnant woman, injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant woman, or injury to the physical or mental health of any existing
children in the family. Additionally, the Abortion Act of 1967 allowed abortion if the unborn child
was going to be born with physical or mental abnormalities, which would leave it seriously
handicapped.).
20. Id. at 138-41 (finding that post-quickening abortion was first outlawed by Connecticut in
1821. Pre-quickening and post-quickening abortion was outlawed by New York in 1828, however
the pre-quickening abortion was only a misdemeanor whereas the post-quickening abortion was
second-degree manslaughter. In the middle and late nineteenth century, the pre- and postquickening distinction disappeared. In the several years before Roe was decided, several states
moved toward less stringent punishments for abortion.).
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-44 (finding that the American Medical Association (AMA) was
largely anti-abortion in the late nineteenth century as the medical community believed it destroyed
human life. However, in 1967, the Committee on Human Reproduction softened its approach
where there was evidence of a threat to the health or life of the mother, the child might be born
with an incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency, or the pregnancy came from rape
or incest. Finally, in 1970, the AMA embraced abortion as a "medical procedure" which "should
be performed by a licensed physician.").
22. Id. at 144-46 (finding that the American Public Health Association (APHA), in 1970,
stated that abortion referrals should be rapidly and simply available, that an "important function of
counseling should be to simplify and expedite the provision of abortion services," that
"psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory," that many individuals, from "sympathetic
volunteers to highly skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors," and that
"contraception and/or sterilization should be discussed with each abortion patient.").
23. Id at 146-47 (finding that the American Bar Association (ABA) approved the Uniform
Abortion Act which defined abortion as "the termination of human pregnancy with an intention
other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus" and allowed an abortion by a
physician licensed or practicing medicine in a hospital or by a female upon herself either within
twenty weeks or after twenty weeks for the following reasons: if there is a substantial risk that it
would endanger the life of the mother; would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother; that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects; or the pregnancy was
the result of rape or incest or statutory rape.).
24. Justice Blackmun's review of the history of abortion relies on two articles written by
Professor Cyril Means. See Francis J. Beckwith, The Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade, and Abortion
Law, I LIBERTY U. L. REv. 37, 47 (2006) (citing Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional

2011]

STATE PERSONHOOD

227

abortion are either new or have been the minority view. 25 Thus,
because restricting abortion would cause significant harms and such
restriction was relatively new, the Court found that a woman's right
to privacy includes the right to choose whether or not to terminate her

pregnancy.2 6
The Court next turned its attention to a potentially competing
right: the unborn's right to life. Texas argued that life begins at
conception and, thus, that the state has a compelling interest in
protecting human life from the moment of conception. 27 However,
Justice Blackmun refused to address the moment at which life begins,
citing the diverging theories present in medicine, philosophy, and
theology as well as the law's historic refusal to endorse any theory of
life.28 Additionally, he refused to leave the issue to the state: "[W]e
do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override
the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake."29
Instead of answering the inherently metaphysical question,
Justice Blackmun turned to a legal definition-the definition of the
word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Court granted
that if the child is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment then the state would have a compelling interest in
protecting the child: "If this suggestion of personhood is established,
the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life
Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment Right About to Risefrom the Nineteenth-Century
Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Amendment Common Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y. L. F. 335 (1971);
Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Fetus: 16641968, 14 N.Y. L. F. 441 (1968) as the source of Blackmun's history). This history of abortion has
been the source of a significant body of legal scholarship and is generally recognized as flawed.
See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 24, at 45-46; John R. Connery, The Ancients and the Medievals on
Abortion: the Consensus the Court Ignored, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING
ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 123 (Dennis J. Horan et al., eds. 1987); Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Abortion and the Law: Blackmun's Distortion of the Historical Record, in ABORTION
AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE . WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 137 (Dennis J. Horan
et al., eds. 1987); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade:
Why Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 85, 88 (2005); Dennis J.
Horan & Thomas J. Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in History, Law, or Logic, in ABORTION
AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 57 (Dennis J. Horan

et al., eds. 1987).
25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
26. Id. at 153.
27. Id at 159.
28. Id at 159-60 (some have argued that this evasion of the metaphysical question of when
life begins avoids the heart of the question presented in Roe. See, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith,
Ignorance of Fetal Status as a Justification of Abortion: A Critical Analysis, in THE SILENT
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNBORN IN AMERICAN CULTURE 33 (Brad Stetson, ed. 1996).).
29. Roe,410 U.S. at 162.
30. Id. at 157.
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would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."' Thus, if
the unborn is deemed a "person," he or she is entitled to the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of his or her right to life. In turn,
the unborn's Fourteenth Amendment right to life would trump the
pregnant woman's Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy and
would allow for-perhaps even require-regulation of abortion by
the state.32 Justice Blackmun looked for a definition of person in the
"Citizens" Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,34 and in
other places in the Constitution." Justice Blackmun found that each
of these sections seem to use the word "person" in only the postnatal
sense.36 Taken together with the history outlined above, Justice
Blackmun found that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn." 7
Based on this definition of the word "person", Justice
Blackmun found only a limited state interest in protecting the
potential life of the unborn and an alternate state interest in protecting
the life of the mother." These state interests "grow in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each

31.
32.

Id at 156-57.
Id, at 159.

33. The "Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment reads, "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads,
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (the Court discusses other places including the qualifications for
representatives and senators (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3), the
Apportionment Clause (U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3), the migration and importation provision
(U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1), the Emolument Clause (U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, cl. 8), the electors
provisions (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2), the qualifications for the office of the president (U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5), extradition provisions (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), the superseded
Fugitive Slave Clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII) the
Fifth Amendment, Twelfth Amendment, Twenty-Second Amendment, and sections two and three
of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
37. Id. at 158.
38. Id. at 159.
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becomes 'compelling.""' Thus, he arrived at the trimester framework
for when each of the state's interests became compelling.4 0
Following Roe, the right to have an abortion was relatively
unimpeded. In Roe, the Court recognized the state interests in
protecting the potential life of the unborn and the life of the mother,
but created an exception for "when it is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother." 4 1 Doe v. Bolton expanded the definition of
"life or health of the mother" to include all factors, including
"physical, emotional, psychological, [and] familial" factors, and the
age of the mother.42 Thus, the state's ability to regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion following Roe is negligible as any pregnancy
impacts the emotions and family structure of a pregnant woman.4 3
The U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee confirmed this in 1983 when it
concluded that there were no legal barriers for women to obtain
abortions at any stage of their pregnancies." Chief Justice Warren
Burger, despite siding with the majority in Roe v. Wade, agreed that
there were no legal barriers in obtaining abortion in his dissent in
Thornburg v. American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists."

Chief Justice Burger said that abortion was "available merely on
demand" and called the state's compelling interest at viability, as
discussed in Roe, "mere shallow rhetoric." 4 6

39. Id. at 162-63.
40. Id. at 163-65 (the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother begins at the end
of the first trimester because the risk of mortality in abortion is less than the risk of mortality in
child birth until the end of the first trimester. Therefore, the state has no compelling interest in
regulating abortion prior to the second trimester and the "decision and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." Following the first
trimester, the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother allows the state to regulate the
abortion procedure, including the "qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion . . .
the licensure of that person . . . the facility in which the procedure is to be performed . . . the

licensing of the facility . . . and the like." The state's interest in the potential life of the unborn
becomes compelling when the fetus becomes viable. Viability is defined by Justice Blackmun as
the fetus having the "capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." This interest
allows the state to "go so far as to proscribe abortion.").
41. Id. at 164-65.
42. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
43. Beckwith, supra note 24, at 40.
44. S. Rep. No. 98-149, at 6 (1983). See Beckwith, supra note 24, at 40.
45. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 783-84
(1986). See Beckwith, supra note 24, at 41.
46. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84. See Beckwith, supra note 24, at 41.
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B. THE "BLACKMUN HOLE" AND THE EFFECTS OF A PERSONHOOD
AMENDMENT

Justice Blackmun's contemplation of the personhood of the
unborn and his statement "[i]f this suggestion of personhood is

established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus'
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment," 4 7 create what is now known as the "Blackmun Hole."48
The idea is that by passing state constitutional amendments that
define the word "person" as including the unborn, the Supreme Court
will eventually be forced to review its holding in Roe. When it does,
it will look at this premise-that the unborn are not included in the
word "person"-and based on agreement among the states that the
word "person" should include the unborn, will come to the opposite
conclusion. Along with the premise changing, the conclusion will
also change. The unborn would have a protectable right to life under
the Fourteenth Amendment-a right that the Court would need to
weigh against the privacy right of the mother. Because the right to
life is the most basic and fundamental of all rights, the Court would
hold that the unborn's right to life trumps the mother's right to
privacy and therefore ban abortion.
Rita Dunaway argues that the personhood amendment is a
worthwhile endeavor as it can create a factual, scientific basis from
which to challenge the holding in Roe v. Wade.4 9 In particular, she
points to Texas's inability in Roe v. Wade to point to state law
sources which defined the unborn child as a person. 0 She argues that
the lack of a state definition cut the argument short in front of the
Supreme Court, but that a push by the states to define the unborn as
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment would sufficiently shift the
factual pinning on which the decision was made and warrant the
Court to overrule its decision." She goes on to argue that it will allow
greater civil liberties to be granted to unborn children, as courts will
have a clear definition of who the state considers a person.5 2 She
advocates a personhood amendment similar to the Missouri preamble

47.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.

48.

See What is Personhood?, supra note 6.

49. Dunaway, supra note 3, at 343.
50. Id
51. Id
52.

Id.
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which the Court refused to rule on in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services."
There is support for an argument that a changing factual basis
could lead the court to overrule Roe v. Wade. In Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice O'Connor discusses
the factual premises of Roe and finds that the situation has not
changed enough to warrant overruling the original holding, finding a
basic right to abortion.5 4 However, it is not clear that an after-the-fact
change in state law would be sufficient to rule that the states clearly
hold that life begins at conception. In fact, Justice Blackmun goes a
long way in his history in Roe to discount the more modem abortion
statutes and to adhere to the earlier opinions regarding human life. 5
However, it is widely recognized today that the history that Justice
Blackmun used in his Roe opinion was faulty.56 Even still, that
knowledge has not called Roe's fundamental holding into serious
question, as others have argued that the Supreme Court's subsequent
abortion jurisprudence has "made the Court impervious to any new
medical, scientific, or factual understand[ing]." 7
Paul Linton, a private attorney specializing in constitutional
law, is a strong opponent of the personhood amendments." In
particular, Linton argues that: (1) personhood amendments will not
bring about the change desired, (2) they are difficult to enact and will
often result in defeats for the pro-life movement, (3) any legal and/or

53. Id. at 344.
54. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
55. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
56. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 24, at 45-46; Forsythe & Presser, supra note 24, at 88
n.13 (2005).
57. Forsythe & Presser, supra note 24, at 91 (quoting McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 85253 (5th Cir. 2004), discussing the inability of the Supreme Court to consider new scientific facts:
"[U]nless [the Supreme Court] creates another exception to the mootness doctrine, the Court will
never be able to examine its factual assumptions on a record made in court . .. The perverse result
of the Court's having determined through constitutional adjudication this fundamental social
policy, which affects over a million women . . . each year, is that the facts no longer matter...
Hard and social science will of course progress even though the Supreme Court averts its eyes. It
takes no expert prognosticator to know that research on women's mental and physical health will
yield an eventual medical consensus. . . . That the Court's constitutional decision making leaves
our nation in a position of willful blindness to evolving knowledge should trouble any
dispassionate observer not only about the abortion decisions, but about a number of other areas in
which the Court unhesitatingly steps into the realm of social policy under the guise of
constitutional adjudication.").
58.

Paul Benjamin Linton, How Not to Overturn Roe v. Wade, 127 FIRST TH[NGS, Nov.

2002, at 15-16, available at http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/LintonAbortion.php; see also
Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of the Unborn Child under State Law, 6 U. ST. THOMAS

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 141 (2011).
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political defeat carries with it a cost, and therefore, (4) the pro-life
movement should stop the futile efforts to pass such legislation." In
making this argument, Linton argues that a state personhood
amendment cannot affect the holding in Roe v. Wade.o
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
finding' that the liberty portion of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment included a right to privacy that protected a
woman's reproductive choices, including her right to have an
abortion.62 Interpreting the United States Constitution, and examining
the other two branches of government, has been a role played by the
United States Supreme Court since Marbury v. Madison." The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution is
definitive and binding. The only recourse to a Supreme Court
interpretation of the Constitution is the Supreme Court overruling its
precedent or an amendment to the Constitution.
The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land
and trumps any state constitutions or state or federal laws that seek to
assert power in the same sphere of governance. As provided in article
VI, clause 2: "[t]his Constitution .. . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound there by, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."64 The Supreme Court has affirmed that this clause
gives the United States Constitution authority over any state
constitution." Thus, attempting to change the interpretation or
application of the Fourteenth Amendment through a state's definition
of person will be ineffectual.
Linton illustrates this problem with a number of examples. 6
"[C]ould a state, by amending its own constitution, redefine the word
'person' as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude
members of a minority group or, say, aliens? Could another state, by
amending its own constitution, redefine the word 'person' to include
59.
60.

Fool's Errand, supra note 7.
Id.

61. Roe,410U.S.atll3.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (concluding that the
Supreme Court had the authority to strike down a law because it violated the Constitution).
64. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
65. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) ("When there is an unavoidable conflict
between the Federal and a State Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of course controls.").
66.

Fool's Errand, supra note 7, at 63.
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other species?""7 These examples and the argument behind them
demonstrate that a state constitutional amendment that contradicts the
United States Constitution or the Supreme Court's interpretation of
that Constitution will not challenge the interpretation. Linton is likely
correct in his critique of state personhood amendments' ability to
change the foundation on which Roe was built. However, although a
state personhood amendment will not directly challenge Roe, the
amendments can effect change.
A properly formulated state personhood amendment could
have many pro-life effects. First, a personhood amendment could
secure the rights of the unborn to the extent possible under current
federal law. The state would recognize its right and duty to protect
the unborn, a subset of persons, under the rights and privileges
available in its constitution. Second, a personhood amendment could
create a foundation on which the state could build in abortion
regulation if Roe is ever overturned. Third, although Linton is
persuasive in his belief that a personhood amendment cannot directly
challenge Roe, there is a chance that a personhood amendment could
give rise to a test case that would challenge and potentially overrule
Roe. Fourth, a personhood amendment, if widely adopted, could
create a factual challenge to Roe. As a greater number of states pass
personhood amendments, Justice Blackmun's factual finding in Roe
that historically and among the states the unborn were not considered
"persons" would become less defensible. This would in turn require a
review of his premise that the unborn are not included in the
Fourteenth Amendment definition of "person" and, thereby, a review
of the holding in Roe. Finally, a personhood amendment can
delineate the metaphysical position of a state. This would not only
challenge Justice Blackmun's factual finding but would put visitors
and immigrants on notice of that state's position on the unborn.
Further, it would unify the state in that metaphysical belief.

III. PAST PERSONHOOD AMENDMENTS
A. PERSONHOOD AMENDMENTS SOLELY DEFINING "PERSON"
Two states have already voted on amendments to their state
constitutions which would explicitly define the meaning of the word

67.

Id.
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"person." Colorado was the first state to vote on such a personhood
amendment. In 2008, Colorado voters defeated Amendment 48 with
73.2% voting "no" and 26.7% voting "yes."" In 2010, Colorado
voters defeated Amendment 62 by a similar margin of 70.5% voting
"no" and 29.4% voting "yes".69 Amendment 48 would have added a
section to the Colorado Bill of Rights which would have read:
Section 31. Person defined. As used in sections 3, 6,
and 25 of article II of the state constitution, the terms
"'person" or "persons" shall include any human being
from the moment of fertilization.o
Amendment 62 was worded similarly:
Section 32. Person defined. As used in sections 3, 6,
and 25 of Article II of the state constitution, the term
"person" shall apply to every human being from the
beginning of the biological development of that
human being."
Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution refers to inalienable rights,72
Section 6 to equality of justice,73 and section 25 to the due process of
law.74
On November 8, 2011, Mississippi rejected a similar
personhood amendment with 58% voting "no" and 42% voting
"yes." The language would have read:

68. Amendment 48 Election Results, supra note 2.
69. Amendment 62 Election Results, supra note 2.
70. Amendment 48-Definition of Person (2008), http://www.leg.state.co.us/LCS/lnitRefr/
0708initRefr.nsf/89fb842d0401c52087256cbc00650696/16f403e0cl9126f98725744b0050fd4d/$
FILE/Amendment%2048.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).

71.

PERSONHOOD COLORADO, Text, http://www.personhoodcolorado.com/text (last visited

Mar. 5, 2012).
72. COLO. CONST., art. II, § 3 ("Inalienablerights. All persons have certain natural, essential
and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness.").
73. COLO. CONST., art. 11,§ 6 ("Equality of justice. Courts of justice shall be open to every
person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right
and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay.").
74. COLO. CONST., art. II, § 25 ("Due process of law. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.").
75. See, e.g., Berlinerblau, supra note 1; Gallagher, supra note 1; New, supra note 1.
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Section 33. Person defined. As used in this Article III
of the state constitution, "The term 'person' or
'persons' shall include every human being from the
moment of fertilization, cloning or the functional
equivalent thereof." 6
Article III of the Mississippi constitution is that state's bill of rights.7 1
These narrow amendments seek to redefine the word "person" within
the context of that state's constitution. This change would afford the
unborn the protections that the constitutions had previously afforded
only postnatal human beings to the extent possible under federal law.
Additionally, it would announce the position of the state and create a
foundation for legislation in the case that Roe is overturned some day.
Although it would not directly contradict Justice Blackmun's holding
in Roe (as the definition is limited to specific articles or clauses of the
state constitutions), it would create a state whose definition of person
would clearly and unequivocally include the unborn. Finally, such an
amendment would articulate the state's metaphysical belief in the
equivalent personhood of the unborn.
However, such a personhood amendment is also limited. The
amendment does not specifically restrict the state legislature from
allowing private abortions but relies on the state courts' applications
to provide actual protection to the unborn. Although it would extend
some rights to the unborn, it would be limited by Roe's right of
privacy. The execution of the personhood amendment could be seen
as abridging the right to privacy found in Roe and the amendment
could be overruled under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.
Additionally, while it does articulate somewhat the state's
metaphysical position on personhood, it is muddled by the
conditioning language which limits the application to the state's
constitution. Finally, it works within the framework of the current
state constitution which could cause conflict between an overbroad
personhood amendment and rights which should be reserved to
postnatal human beings (for example, congressional apportionment).

76.

PERSONHOOD

Mississippi,

Amendment

26:

What

It

Says?,

http://personhoodmississippi.com/amendment-26/what-it-says.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
77. MISS. CONST. art. 3.
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B. PERSONIOOD STATUTES DEFINING "HUMAN BEING"

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services looked at the
preamble to a Missouri statute, which provides:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at
conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests
in life, health, and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have
protectable interests in the life, health, and
well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state
shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge
on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of
development, all the rights, privileges, and
immunities available to other persons, citizens, and
residents of this state, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States, and decisional
interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme
Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the
statutes and constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children"
or "unborn child" shall include all unborn child or
children or the offspring of human beings from the
moment of conception until birth at every stage of
biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
creating a cause of action against a woman for
indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to
properly care for herself or by failing to follow any
particular program of prenatal care."
In Webster, the Supreme Court chose not to address the
constitutionality of the Missouri preamble because it was only an

78.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. §

1.205 (1986)).
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abstract proposition and had not concretely restricted the parties
involved."
Rita Dunaway has adopted similar language as her suggested
language for a personhood amendment. 0 She argues that the fact that
the Supreme Court did not strike this language down when it had the
chance in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the fact that it
has survived twenty years past that decision demonstrate that the
language would survive a legal challenge.'
South Dakota also passed a variant of a personhood statute.82
In particular, the statute defined a human being as "an individual
living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn
human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from
fertilization to full gestation."" The Eighth Circuit upheld this
definition in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota v. Rounds because it was scientifically and factually true.84
However, the Eighth Circuit explicitly refused to address the
metaphysical question of when a human life begins and stated that
the statute did not address that point."
While these definitions carry some limited metaphysical
weight, both the Supreme Court in Webster and the Eighth Circuit in
Rounds did not find that the statutes packed much of a legal punch. In
Webster, the Court refused to address the constitutionality of the
preamble because it did not concretely restrict the parties. 6 The
South Dakota statute only required the physician to make a statement
that an abortion would end the life of an individual human being.87
Thus, it is similar to other statutes which require certain disclosures
and does not unduly burden the woman in deciding to abort. Clearly,
these statutes do not secure the rights of the unborn, create a direct
contradiction of Roe, or establish a foundation for regulating abortion
post-Roe.

79. Id. at 506-07.
80. Dunaway, supra note 3, at 344.
81. Id. at 343-44.
82. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-1 (2006).
83. Id. at § 34-23A-1(4).
84. PlannedParenthoodMinn., N. D., S. D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2006)
(en banc), aff'd Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011).
85. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 736.
86. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506-07.
87. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2005).
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C. LEGALISTIC PERSONHOOD AMENDMENT
Paul Linton advocates an alternate, more
formulation of the personhood amendment:
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legalistic

Section 1. The policy of the State of [insert name of
state] is to protect the life of every unborn child from
conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the
federal constitution.
Section 2. Nothing in this constitution shall be
construed to grant or secure any right relating to
abortion or the funding thereof.
Section 3. No public funds shall be used to pay for any
abortion, except to save the life of the mother."
Linton argues that this language would achieve three things: (1) it
would make clear the state's policy of protecting unborn human life
to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution, (2) it would
overrule and prevent any interpretations of the state constitution as
providing a right to abortion, and (3) it would prohibit state funding
of abortion except to save the life of the mother. 9 He also offers
some alternate language to avoid confusion over the definition of
conception and Supremacy Clause challenges under the Hyde
amendment. 0
While Linton's statute would offer some protection to the
unborn and would establish a foundation for regulation if Roe is
overturned, it does not make the strong metaphysical statement about
the state's belief concerning the life of the unborn that the other
amendments made. This statute, with its missing element, would
certainly not contradict Roe, but it would also fail to add to a
potential factual challenge of Roe and fail to make a significant
metaphysical statement on the nature of life.

88.
89.

Fool's Errand, supra note 7, at 67.
Fool's Errand, supra note 7, at 67.

90.

Id. at 68 (to avoid a challenge on the definition of conception, Linton suggests redrafting

§ I to read: "The policy of the State of [insert name of state] is to protect the life of every unborn
child at every stage of gestation in utero [or 'at every stage of pregnancy'] from fertilization until
birth, to the extent permitted by the federal constitution." To avoid a challenge from the Hyde
amendment he suggests adding "or as otherwise required by the federal constitution" to the end of
§ 3.).
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D. FEDERAL PERSONHOOD AMENDMENT

The American Life League has accepted language developed
by Judie Brown for implementation as an amendment to the United
States Constitution:
Purpose: To establish that legal personhood is granted
to all human beings in the United States, from the
beginning of their biological development.
Section 1:
The right to life is the paramount
fundamental right of a person.

and most

Section 2:
With respect to the right to life guaranteed to persons
by the fifth and 14th articles of amendment to the
Constitution, the word "person" applies to all human
beings; irrespective of age, health, function, physical
or mental dependency or method of reproduction,
from the beginning of their biological development.
Section 3:
Congress and the several States, including territories
under United States control, shall have concurrent
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 4:
Definitions
Human being: Any organism, including the single-cell
human embryo, irrespective of the method of
reproduction, who possesses a genome specific for and
consistent with an individual member of the human
species.
Human genome: The total amount of nuclear and
extra-nuclear DNA genetic material that constitutes an
organism as an individual member of the human
species-including the single-cell human embryo.
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Human embryo: The term is used to define all human
beings from the beginning of the embryonic period of
their biological development through eight weeks;
irrespective of age, health, function, physical or
mental dependency or method of reproduction;
whether in vivo or in vitro.
Human fetus: The term is used to define all human
beings from the beginning of the fetal period of their
biological development (the beginning of nine weeks)
through birth; irrespective of age, health, function,
physical or mental dependency or method of
reproduction; whether in vivo or in vitro.
Personhood: The legal recognition of a human being's
full status as a human person that applies to all human
beings; irrespective of age, health, function, physical
or mental dependency or method of reproduction;
from the beginning of their biological development. 91
The language in this sample amendment is strong as it provides a
metaphysical definition of personhood which includes the unborn.
Additionally, it would directly contradict and overrule Roe if enacted
in the United States Constitution. It would secure the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights for the unborn and would establish a
national regulation of abortion. However, the above language is
unlikely to pass nationally and would fail on a state level. The
process for amending the United States Constitution is difficult and
unlikely for such a sensitive issue. If passed on the state level, a
federal court would hold that the above language was clearly
unconstitutional under Roe. 92
IV.

THE AUTHOR'S MODEL PERSONHOOD AMENDMENT

I would blend the legalistic approach sponsored by Paul
Linton with the more philosophic nature of the other amendments:

91. Judie Brown, The FederalPersonhoodAmendment, CELEBRATE LIFE, 15 16 (Sept. -Oct.
2008), http://www.all.org/article/index/id/MzAxOA/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
92.

See Fool's Errand,supra note 7, at 67.
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The purpose of this amendment is to recognize the
unique, individual human person who exists at every
stage of pregnancy and their inherent right to life.
Section 1: The right to life is the paramount and most
fundamental right of a person.
Section 2: Every person, regardless of age, health,
physical or mental dependency or method of
reproduction, from the beginning of their biological
development, is entitled to state protection of their
right to life.
Section 3: The term "person," as found in this
amendment, applies to all human beings regardless of
their level of biological development.
Section 4: Nothing in this constitution shall be
construed to grant or secure any right relating to
abortion or the funding thereof.
Section 5: This amendment shall be read to give the
fullest protection to unborn human beings permitted
by the United States Constitution.
Section 6: If any provision in this amendment is or
becomes unenforceable, that shall not affect the
enforceability of the remainder of this amendment.
First, this amendment would establish what many already believe: the
right to life is necessary and transcends every other natural right.
Second, it secures that right for every person, including the unborn, to
the extent allowed by the United States Constitution and its
interpretation. Thus, the amendment would not be unconstitutional
under Roe, but could present a factual challenge to that case. Further,
if Roe were overturned, the amendment would scale up its protection
of the unborn to the extent allowed under the Constitution. Finally,
such an amendment would clearly articulate the state's metaphysical
belief that life and personhood begin at the earliest stages of
biological development.
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While the amendment above would be an effective tool for securing
the rights of the unborn, there are some issues that arise from such an
amendment. First, the amendment specifically speaks of a right to life
but not other rights, some of which are currently recognized, such as
the right to sue in tort and the right to property. This iteration of a
personhood amendment does not specifically address other rights
because the right to life is the most basic and fundamental of rights
and is the right that is currently being denied to the unborn. Although
the other rights are important, they have been and can be provided as
states see fit. As states begin to recognize a right to life, other rights
can and will likely follow. Additionally, the language of the
amendment could be changed to include the other rights.
Second, the amendment would call into question the
definition of "beginning of their biological development" and
whether or not certain contraception devices should be permissible.
Although the amendment was not intended to ban certain birth
control devices or in vitro fertilization, states can often decide those
issues themselves and adopt slightly variant language if they choose
not to ban such activities. For example, substituting "beginning of
their biological development" with "implantation" or "conception"
would provide different starting points for the amendment.
Third, such an amendment could also be read to mandate
state-provided health care as it calls for "state protection of [every
person's] right to life." Again, this was not the intent of the
amendment and could be corrected by rephrasing the language. For
example, section 2 could be reworded to say "every person,
regardless of age, health, physical or mental dependence, or method
of reproduction is entitled to state protection against public or private
invasions of their right to life" or "no person shall deprive another
person of life, regardless of either person's age, health, physical or
mental dependency, or method of reproduction." Such a change
would limit the protection to actions taken against persons instead of
other health causes.
Finally, the amendment could call into question the autonomy
of pregnant women and a requirement of state monitoring. Again, this
was not the intent of the amendment and such an interpretation could
be avoided by a change in wording. As with the above issue,
changing the wording to avoid affirmative action against the unborn
solves the problem of supervising for maternal neglect.
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Although the focus of this paper was to provide model
personhood language which adequately addresses the goals and
concerns associated with a personhood amendment, there are other
things that should be addressed.
A. A STATE PERSONHOOD AMENDMENT IS TIE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR
DECIDING THE ABORTION ISSUE

1. Although the Right to Life is a Natural,Inherent Right, Abortion is
Rightly Governed by the State

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court took regulation of
abortion out of the power of the state and protected the practice under
a Constitutional right.93 Because rights to life and privacy are
fundamental, natural rights, it could be seen as proper to remove
them from the power of regulation by the states and protect them
within the United States Constitution. However, there are significant
reasons for placing such a sensitive and contentious issue under the
domain of the state. 94
a. State policepowers

States have the right and duty to protect and defend life under
the state police powers. Such a right and responsibility should also
come with the ability to decide what life the state must protect. First,
states must take into account things such as state resources when
deciding the scope and protection possible. Second, each state has a
93.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

94. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that because the Constitution does not address abortion and historically some states
proscribed it, the issue is properly left to the states); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser,
Restoring Self-Government on Abortion: A Federalism Amendment, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301,

320-30 (2006) (arguing for a federalism amendment to the Constitution to overturn Roe and the
surrounding jurisprudence and return the issue of abortion to the states); Bruce Walker, State
Legislatures Take Up Abortion Issues, THE NEW AMERICAN (June 7, 2010),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/constitution/3714-state-egislatures-take-upabortion-issues (arguing that state regulation has, historically, been measured and reasonable and
thus would be equally well reasoned if abortion were returned to the states).
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unique constituency that expects a different level of protection and
invasiveness from the state. This makes the state the best decider on
the level of protection to provide. By removing these choices from
the state, the Supreme Court imposed on states a mandatory handsoff approach to protecting the unborn, regardless of the beliefs and
resources available to each state. Thus, the state is an appropriate
place to decide abortion law.
b. Subsidiarity

When given the choice between deciding things at the local or
national level, the local decision is generally more in tune with its
population and the needs of that population. By choosing to decide
the abortion issue at the highest level-as a Constitutional issue-the
Supreme Court neglects the better decision-making power of the
local government. Because abortion is such a sensitive and
controversial issue, it is better to decide it at the lowest level possible,
rather than having a broad, sweeping decision from the highest law in
the land.
c. States are more likely to have common metaphysicalbeliefs

States and communities are more likely composed of groups
who share a common metaphysical system of belief than the nation as
a whole. By deciding such a sensitive issue through Constitutional
interpretation, the Supreme Court neglected the interests of
individuals interested in living under a system of laws consistent with
their beliefs.
d

Provides diversity among the states

Allowing states the ability to decide how to handle abortion
would allow some states to proscribe and others to allow. In turn, this
would create diversity among the states, which would both encourage
debate and allow conscientious objectors on either side to voice their
opinion by moving. Some have argued the potential for diversity is
itself proof that the issue should remain with the federal
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government. 95 This argument fails with Roe as it presumes a privacy
right to abortion. It imposes a permissive, immoral standard on the
country simply because it is "easier" than having differences among
the states.
2. A State ConstitutionalAmendment is Preferableto a State Statute
a. State Statutes are Poor ProtectorsofRights

A natural right is more properly placed in a constitutional
amendment than a statute. Simply from an organizational perspective,
people look to constitutions for an enumeration of their rights before
looking to statutes. The placement also says something about the
permanence of the right. Although a statute could protect a citizen's
right, it is not binding on future legislation. While laws secure rights,
they secure those rights only at the discretion of the standing
legislature. Subsequent decisions by the legislature can ignore,
modify, or reverse previous legislation. Further, the ease of undoing
statutes could create uncertainty and confusion in the status of the
law and the community's concept of right and wrong. Contrarily, an
amendment to the constitution would secure certain rights and require
enforcement and protection of those rights by the courts. Finally, a
state constitutional amendment generally requires some input from
the public beyond electing legislators. For an issue as sensitive as
abortion, it is more properly decided by the people than by a group
elected from those people.
b. Abortion is an Issue ProperlyDecidedby DirectDemocracy

Direct democracy allows individuals to vote on issues directly
through initiatives or referendums instead of by electing
representatives. 6 The state personhood amendments require the use
of direct democracy to pass state constitutional amendments that
define "person" based on a majoritarian vote.97 Molly Carter, a recent
graduate of Boston University School of Law, argues that regulations

95.

See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 125-28 (W. W.

Norton ed., 1990) (arguing that this would allow invasive state restrictions on mothers, including
prohibiting mothers from crossing state lines to procure an abortion).
96. Carter, supra note 7, at 308.
97. Id.
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concerning the abortion issue in general are an inappropriate use of
direct democracy. 8
Direct democracy carries some advantages and some
disadvantages any time it is used. A public vote is an easy way to test
the public's opinion on a topic.9 9 Additionally, direct democracy can
diminish the impact that special interest groups have in regulating
issues and create greater participation and legitimacy in the decisions
made." However, direct democracy also allows the majority to
control the minority, regardless of the truth and benefit of the
minority's position. 0 The diminished impact of special interest
groups is not always clear, as demonstrated by the controversy
surrounding the recent passing of California's Proposition 8.102 Direct
democracy also risks a lack of education in those participating and,
relatedly, a lack of careful consideration about what an individual's
vote will mean. 03 This lack of knowledge and careful deliberation
about the effect that a law will have could mean dangerous or
misdirected regulations that would have been corrected if they had
been debated by a legislature and subject to an executive's veto.
Carter is convincing in her concern for the proper use of
direct democracy. There is reason to be concerned that unvetted
amendments voted on by the general public could lack the foresight
that a bill debated by the legislature would have. However,
referendums already require legislative approval to be presented on a
ballot. Initiative amendments to state constitutions, although draftable
by any citizen and placed on the ballot following a successful
petition, would likely be vetted or written by lawyers, politicians, or
the legal community. If they were not vetted and were found to
violate an individual's rights or generally lead to negative,
unintended consequences, recourse would be available for the injured
persons in the courts.
Further, this dim view of direct democracy bespeaks a
paternalistic view of government as protecting the misguided masses
98. Personhood amendments are not the only abortion questions which have been addressed
by direct democracy. See id. at 312-15 (presenting examples such as state funding, parental
consent, criminalization of abortion, etc.).
99.

100.
101.

Id. at 315.

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 317-18.

102. See Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at Al (arguing that Mormon's significant contributions to passing the
measure were significant in the final vote). See also Carter,supra note 7, at 318-19.
103. Carter, supra note 7, at 320-22.
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from their wrongheaded mob mentality. While mob mentality can be
injurious to the minority party, it is not necessarily so. The
assumption that the average citizen would be willing to impinge the
constitutional rights of another that this country is founded on
requires defense in a day when everyone is keenly aware of his or her
own rights.
Finally, abortion is a polarizing issue. Each side of the debate
believes that they are defending a core, natural right. While leaving
the issue to the legislature can diminish the ferocity of the discussion,
the decision regarding such important, fundamental rights should not
be left to the legislature for a vote that will be influenced by
electability factors. Citizens are more than capable of weighing the
potential rights and coming to a conclusion. Few citizens have not
formed an opinion on abortion. These opinions are not arbitrary but
are based on the citizens' fundamental beliefs about the meaning of
life and the importance of freedom. For such a morally significant
issue, it is right and proper for individuals to have direct influence on
the outcome.
B. PERSONHOOD AMENDMENTS COULD CHANGE THE CULTURE'S
METAPHYSICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PERSONHOOD

This article has discussed at length the metaphysical import of
the different sample amendments. The nature of human life is
important in the abortion debate and in other decisions that the
government must make regarding life. The reason for this focus is
that I believe the fight is won or lost at the individual's philosophic
beliefs. Today, America's adherence to subjectivism and moral
relativism doom the pro-life community to fighting an uphill battle.
This is largely due to America's embrace of existentialism as
reflected in its culture, its legislation, and its jurisprudence.
America's philosophical paradigm is largely existential.' 0 4 As
the nation of the "American Dream," freedom, and autonomy,
America was a natural ground for the philosophical theory.10
However, this reliance on existentialist thinking has caused a
rejection of objective reality in favor of a subjectively defined reality
and an emphasis on individual autonomy and freedom of choice. 0

104.

GEORGE COTKIN, EXISTENTIAL AMERICA (2002).

105.

Id

106. See Rebecca Rabkin, From Kierkegaard to Kennedy: Existentialist Philosophy in the
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This subjective view of the world and metaphysical truth is keenly
felt by the pro-life movement."' The issue of objective truth versus
subjective truth is particularly important on issues regarding life. Roe
v. Wade balanced the constitutional interests of the pregnant woman
against the constitutional interests of the unborn.'"0 However, the
Court explicitly refused to reach the question of when life begins.o 9
Instead of embracing the question as a search for an objective truth,
the Court entertained a subjective, legal fiction in finding, "the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense."" 0
This subjective view of life and personhood was reaffirmed in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey when the definition of life was
relegated to an "intimate and personal choice": "At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""' This
passage rejects the idea of a "Truth" about life and relegates the
metaphysical question to a personal preference."12 Ronald Dworkin
supports this subjective view regarding the truth about when

Supreme Court's Decision in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey and Its Effect on the Right to Privacy,
31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611, 614-15 (2004) ("[t]o Kierkegaard, the truth could not exist

without a relationship to the individual, and thus it was necessarily subjective."); id. at 624
("[w]hat follows is that a woman must have the ability to choose whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy").
107. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments,
Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEX. L. REV. 559, 628
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assume a subjective worldview and fail when presented in an objective worldview); Sidney
Heidersdorf, The Objective Truth About Abortion, JUNEAU EMPIRE (May 27, 2005),
http://juneauempire.com/stories/052705/let 20050527016.shtml (discussing a previous column
and the assumption of a lack of objective truth in "giv[ing] those struggling with abortion

decisions the benefit of the doubt."); Michael Scaperlanda, Rehabilitatingthe "Mystery Passage":
An Examination of the Supreme Court's Anthropology Using the PersonalisticNorm Explicit in
the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyaa, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 631, 638 ("the Court's creation story
is incomplete because it divorces the pursuit of personal, subjective ends from the objective reality
of the person.").
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life/personhood exists."' In particular, he states that we do better to
avoid the questions about fetal personhood and when human life
begins and focus instead on the legal questions: "[W]hether states can
justify anti-abortion legislation on one of the two groundsderivative or detached-that I described."ll 4
The counterpart to the subjective view of life is the
reaffirmation of the value of individual autonomy and choice."' In
both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the essential
tug-of-war was between the autonomy and freedom of choice of the
pregnant woman and the objective human life of the unborn."6 In
both cases, the autonomy of the pregnant woman won out as they
rejected an objective view of human life.
There has been a push for greater subjectivity in discussing
issues of life."' In Washington v. Glucksberg, Ronald Dworkin,
Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and
Judith Jarvis Thomson submitted an amicus brief commonly called
the "Philosopher's Brief.""' The Philosopher's Brief argued that,
based on the precedent in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, there exists
a constitutionally-protected interest in hastening one's own death.'9
Rebecca Rabkin also argued that by embracing the existentialist view
discussed in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, the Court should embrace
the same view and extend the liberty right to the right to die and the

113. Ronald Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights: Whether andHow Roe Should be Overruled, 59
U. CHI. L. REv. 381, 397-98.
114. Id. Dworkin defines derivative responsibility as the responsibility of the government to
protect the rights and interests of its citizens. Id. at 396. Dworkin defines detached responsibility
as a responsibility that government owes, external to its citizens, to protect human life as an
"objective or intrinsic good, a value in itself." Id. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION

13 (1994).
115.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

116. Id.at833;Roe,410U.S.atll3.
117. Note that some have been resistant to extending the existential view of human life. See,
e.g., Scaperlanda, supra note 107, at 638. Some have also questioned the use of philosophy at all
when making judicial decisions. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of
Philosophers by the Supreme Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371 (1998) (arguing that philosophy
does not have a proper role in judicial decision-making). Some have endorsed the use of
philosophy without dictating the philosophy to be used. See, e.g., Thom Brooks, Does Philosophy
Deserve a Place at the Supreme Court?, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 1 (2003) (criticizing Rao's

argument that philosophy should be distinct and never used in the Supreme Court).
118. Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon,
and Judith Jarvis Thomson as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708956 (hereinafter "Philosopher's
Brief'). This brief was also submitted in Vacco v. Quill, 512 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
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right to sexual intimacy. 1 20 This emphasis on embracing the
existential view demonstrates the importance of the pro-life
movement asserting its own philosophical paradigm.
Many legal scholars have argued that just as culture can
impact the laws of a region, the laws of a region are a part of/impact
the culture of that region.121 For example, tougher regulations on
smoking and limitations on where smoking is permitted have at least
some part in the change from smoking as an acceptable behavior to

an aberrant behavior.122
In the same way, passing a state personhood amendment that
defines an unborn child as a person can impact the culture of that
state. First, the personhood amendments have already and will
continue to receive publicity from local and national media.123
Second, because of the media coverage, people will be encouraged to
discuss the issue with their friends, coworkers, and family, thereby
passing on the message and provoking thought on one's own
metaphysical beliefs. Third, having the measure on the ballot will
require voters to confront the issue and weigh their own beliefs about
life, death, and personhood. If the measure is passed, it will become
part of the state constitution, the highest governing document of the
state. The amendment would be afforded special deference because
of its place in the state constitution. Finally, any legal challenges to
the amendment would give greater publicity to the amendment and
encourage further thought.

120. Rabkin, supra note 106, at 629-34.
121. See, e.g., Erik D. Fritsvold, Under the Law: Legal Consciousness and Radical
Environmental Activism, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 799 (2009); Douglas J. Goodman, Approaches
to Law and Popular Culture, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2006); Menachem Mautner, Three
Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839 (2011); Naomi Mezey, Law as
Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2001).
122. Howard K. Koh, Luk X. Joossens, & Gregory N. Connolly, Making Smoking History
Worldwide, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1496, 1497 (2007).
123. See, e.g., Mark Barna, Groups to Make Another Try for 'Personhood' Measure,
COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE (June 29, 2009), http://www.gazette.com/articles/personhood57580-colorado-jones.html; Lynn Bartels, Colorado "Personhood" Proposal's 2010 Ballot Title
Approved, DENVER POST (Aug. 06, 2009), http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci13001371;
Kelly Boyer, Fetal Personhood Amendment Returns with a Vengeance, HUFFINGTON POST (June
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C. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROLIFE MOVEMENT
1. PersonhoodAmendments Do Not Completely Address the Entirety of
the Rights that Belong to the Unborn

If the state personhood amendments somehow succeeded in
redefining "person" in the federal government, the definition would
need to be reviewed and reworked to provide the rights appropriate to
the unborn.1 4 David Westfall argues persuasively that considering the
unborn a "person" will require significant review of the potential and
appropriate rights and responsibilities.'2 5 Westfall provides three
potential approaches: (1) the rights of the unborn could be limited to
protection from abortion, (2) the rights of the unborn could be
protection from bodily injury but no protection from injury to
property rights or other interest, and (3) the rights of the unborn could
be as expansive as any other person's rights.12 6
If the rights of the unborn are limited to protection from
abortion, the term "person" is merely a fagade for an attack on Roe v.
Wade.127 Additionally, under this definition of personhood, one could
argue that the unborn would be deprived of civil rights natural to
other persons and thus to themselves. Defining the unborn as a
"6person" merely for the purpose of granting them protection from
abortion accepts the notion that we can pick and choose the rights
appropriate to individuals despite the clear language in the
Constitution that such rights should be afforded to every person. It
creates a dichotomy whereby we treat pre-born persons differently,
despite defining them the same way.
If the unborn have a right to be protected from bodily injury
but no right to be protected from injury to their property right or other
interest, we are again bifurcating "persons" into two subsets. This
bifurcation can easily become a trifurcation, ad nauseum, in creating
a hierarchy of persons with those at the top holding the greatest
number of rights. Westfall argues primarily on this point that the
rights of an unborn child to life could collide with the same or
different rights of the mother.'28 If the unborn have a right to life and
124. See Judith M. Nyhus Johnson, Minnesota's "Crack Baby" Law: Weapon of War or Link
in a Chain?, 8 LAW & INEQ. 485, 515-17 (1990); Westfall, supra note 7, at 103.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Westfall, supra note 7, at 103.
Id.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 104.
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freedom from bodily harm, the federal government would need to
weigh the rights of the mother against that fundamental right of the
unborn and decide, on a case-by-case basis, whose rights supersede
the other's.12 9
Finally, if an unborn child were granted all of the rights under
the Constitution that another person were afforded, the results would
be absurd.13 0 Granting the unborn the fullness of rights granted to
others would affect legislative apportionment,'
distribution of
governmental fiscal benefits,' 32 civil liberties,"' the federal income

tax, 3 4 criminal law,' 35 torts,136 health care and medical malpractice,3 7
laboratory research and in-vitro fertilization,"' gender-based
employment discrimination,9 and others.
Judith Nyhus Johnson reviewed the rights being granted to
unborn children in 1990 and found that the law had embraced tort
claims both against third parties and against the mother.14 0 She also
repeated the warning that accepting these unborn "person" rights
could lead to significant violations of the rights of the mother,
especially as technological advances impose greater duties on the
mother to ensure the proper development of her unborn child. 4 '
Others have struggled with the criminal liability of third parties
imposed because of a recognition of the unborn's "personhood"
rights.'42 Still others have explained these increasing unborn rights as
legal fictions to protect state interests, not the unborn's interest.143
Regardless of the many arguments concerning the rights
surrounding fetal personhood, the recent history has demonstrated
129. Id
130. See, e.g., id. at 104-07.
131. Westfall, supra note 7 at 107-10.
132. Id at 110.
133. Id. at 110- l.
134. Id. atll l-13.
135. Idat 113-15.
136. Id. at115-16.
137. Westfall, supra note 7 at 116-20.
138. Id at 120.
139. Id at 120-28.
140. Johnson, supra note 124, at 511-15.
141. Id. at 517-25; see also CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER
AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS (1993); RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS (2000).
142. See, e.g., Walen, supra note 7, at 163 (arguing that state laws punishing the harming of
unborn children pose a direct threat to Roe).
143. See, e.g., Juliana Vines Crist, The Myth of Fetal Personhood:Reconciling Roe and Fetal
Homicide Laws, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851, 867-69 (2010) (arguing that state feticide laws do
not pose a threat to federal abortion jurisprudence).
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that the government can and will address the issue rationally.
Although many states have passed feticide laws or allowed tort cases
against third parties, no state has struggled with whether or not it is
required to allow the unborn a vote or proper legislative
apportionment. While defining the unborn as persons would be a
significant step in the law and would require significant litigation and
legislation to govern the rights warranted by personhood of the
unborn, there is no indication that states would shut down from an
inability to census the unborn. Thus, this argument, while an
important thought experiment on the work yet to be done, does not
present a significant hindrance to unborn personhood.
2.

OverrulingRoe v. Wade Could Leave a Nationwide Gap in Abortion
Regulation

Prior to Roe v. Wade, states had laws on the books regulating
abortion. However, following Roe v. Wade, many of those laws were
either repealed or made ineffective by the decision in Roe that the
state did not have an interest in the first trimester of pregnancy, an
interest in the woman's health alone in the second trimester, and an
interest in the potentiality of life tempered by the mother's health in
the third trimester. Fewer than one-third of states have retained their
pre-Roe laws.144 Most of those states that have retained their laws
would not prohibit abortion if Roe v. Wade were overruled.145 This
presents a significant issue for the pro-life movement and calls into
question the efficacy of overruling Roe v. Wade, if possible, through
a state constitutional amendment. In particular, what happens to the
forty-nine other states if one state's constitutional amendment is
successful in overruling Roe v. Wade?
Richard Fallon argues that overruling Roe v. Wade may not be
as "neat and simple" as many believe it would be.'4 6 He argues, first,
that because of the cultural significance and divisiveness of abortion,
the Supreme Court would not be able to remain neutral on the
issue.147 For example, if one state chose to outlaw citizens crossing

144. Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of Abortion in the States if Roe v. Wade is
Overruled, 23 ISSUEs L. & MED. 3, 4 (2007) (analyzing on a state-by-state basis the current state
laws regarding abortion and discussing the nationwide regulation if Roe was overruled).
145. Id
146.

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-

Roe World, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 611, 652 (2007).
147. Id. at 652-53.
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state lines to procure abortions, they would need the help of the
federal government to secure that regulation. Because the Supreme
Court would need to weigh in on these issues at some level, the issue
will never fully return to the states and will likely be subject to
federal jurisdiction.148 Second, Fallon argues that returning abortion
regulation to the states would create significant issues involving state
and national citizenship.149 Again, the Supreme Court would need to
weigh in on issues such as regulating out-of-state abortion, free
speech in advertising abortion, and the difference between state and
national citizenship.15 0
First, based on the legal challenges to the personhood
amendments, it seems unlikely that they will themselves overrule Roe
v. Wade or even create a test case which could prompt the Supreme
Court to overrule the case. However, if the amendments were
successful, it would emphasize the importance of enacting the
personhood amendments in every state to fill that regulatory gap. The
status quo is unacceptable to most if not all of the pro-life movement.
Currently, abortion is available nearly on demand. Although the
Supreme Court has walked back the availability of abortion and has
not required the state or federal government to fund it, abortion is too
prevalent for the pro-life movement to stop acting.' 5 ' Although some
unintended consequences may result from a push to overturn Roe v.
Wade, it remains a worthwhile endeavor.
3.

The Efficacy ofAttempting to Pass PersonhoodAmendments

The recent defeat of the Mississippi Personhood Amendment
gives greater support to Paul Linton's argument that the personhood
amendment path is injurious to the pro-life movement.'52 Each defeat
does carry a toll. Additionally, some have noted that the personhood
amendments are creating a schism within the pro-life movement
between those who oppose this method and those who support it.'
14 8. Id
149. Id at 653.
150. Id
151. Rachel K. Jones & Kathryn Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the
United States, PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 41, 43 (2011) (citing the
percent of pregnancies, as of 2008, that end in abortion, excluding miscarriages, as 22.4%).
152. Fool's Errand,supra note 7.
153. See, e.g., Dave Bohon, Mississippi Voters Reject Pro-Life PersonhoodAmendment, THE
NEW AMERICAN (Nov. 9, 2011), http://thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/9717mississippi-voters-reject-pro-life-personhood-amendment; Michael Brendan Dougherty, Most
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Such division is unacceptable and must be addressed. However, the
model amendment that I have offered addresses some of the division
(e.g., personhood amendments banning certain birth control) and the
urgency of the pro-life cause still supports action.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are many reasons to delay action on the personhood
amendments and to wait for other changes. Some argue that it costs
too much to press forward when the amendments will not have the
immediate effect of overruling Roe v. Wade. Others worry about the
procedure involved or the significant effect that these amendments
could have on the laws of the states. Still others worry about the
policy implications. The reasons for action outweigh the reasons for
delay. Twenty-two percent of pregnancies end in abortion.'5 4 This
unspeakable statistic alone demands action. Additionally, the march
continues to redefine life for convenience. If the pro-life movement
does not stand up for truth today, they will stand alone tomorrow.
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